

LETTERS

The Race Across France: Who Led the Way?

Dear Sir:

The article about the 4th Armored Division (Sep-Oct 2000, MAJ Don Vandergriff) was an excellent example of armored warfare in WWII and the use of combined arms teams to accomplish the mission. However, the 4th AD was only one of the many armored divisions to employ these same tactics.

The fourth paragraph cites the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, and how, from that point, the 4th AD led the "rest of the Army" across France and into Germany.

The 5th Armored Division also participated in that breakout and was called Patton's Ghost Division because the media was not told of its involvement initially. We liberated Le Mans, made a U-turn to help form the Falaise Gap at Argentan, were relieved to head toward the Seine River just north of Paris. Next was a march through Paris and, within a few days, we reached the Belgian border.

New orders were to take the Prince of Luxembourg into his country and liberate it, which we did. Additionally, CCR was the first American unit to breach the Siegfried Line at Wallendorf on 14 September 1944. We were stopped by new orders and came back into Luxembourg.

Other actions included being the only armored division to fight in Huertgen Forest. Then, after crossing the Rhine River, we raced across Germany to the Elbe River and were the closest American unit to Berlin when hostilities ceased.

To repeat, the 4th AD did not lead the 5th Armored Division across France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and Germany.

ROBERT M. HERMAN
LTC, Armor (Ret.)
Former member of C Co, 628 TD Bn.
(Attached to CCR 5th AD)

Flawed Planning, Not Politicians Doomed Early Korea Fight

Dear Sir:

The article about the Army's unpreparedness for warfare in Korea ("Tanks and the Korean War...", Sep-Oct 2000) completely misses the real problem of the Army's history of flawed planning. It is easy to blame politicians for the Army's financial woes, but the catastrophic decisions were made by generals. Even bad political decisions are usually due to unrealistic, overly-optimistic, or plainly false reports provided by uniformed leaders.

Lamenting a lack of advanced tank technology is off the mark. Our M46 Pattons and M26 Pershings completely outclassed the enemy's T-34/85 tanks, while even our older M4 Shermans were at no technical disadvantage.

The problem was that Army leaders earlier decided that Korea was unsuitable for tanks

and never planned for their employment. Tanks were poorly maintained or simply worn out, and crews were poorly trained, but these are problems of command priorities, not "technology." To save operational and support costs, generals even convinced themselves that a company of light tanks, M24 Chaffees, could substitute for the divisional battalion and three regimental companies of Patton or Pershing tanks that were organic to an infantry division. All was ignorant bliss.

Our leaders knew neither the terrain, the enemy, nor their own lack of capability. Soldiers were untrained, equipment was worn out, and *ad hoc* light forces attempted to stop a conventional combined arms team that kicked their butt all the way to the Pusan Perimeter. Eventually, heavy forces arrived in theater and stabilized the situation, while an amphibious assault (something that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs GEN Omar Bradley, himself, had earlier pronounced would never happen again in modern warfare) broke the enemy's logistical tail and shattered his forces.

Why does this matter? Because the Army needs to understand what was wrong in order to learn and avoid similar mistakes. The worst lessons are the false ones. As a profession, the Army cannot keep blaming its difficulties on politicians when its own leaders bring about disasters through their own ignorance.

More than a decade later, Army leaders repeated the very same blunders in Vietnam. Again, they decided that the terrain was unsuitable for armor, especially M48 Pattons, and stripped away divisional tank units when deploying troops. It was left to the ARVN to teach their U.S. advisors how to employ M113 APCs as what would be known as ACAVs, or Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles. This eventually led to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). The lesson was plain: The side with armored firepower has the advantage.

Despite the Army's tremendous success during Desert Shield and Storm, it again (or still) seeks to rapidly toss light forces into harm's way because it refuses to plan for deploying the required logistical tail. Today's Army is ignoring maintenance and allowing equipment to deteriorate because it is confident that an as yet undefined technical breakthrough will solve everything. The same complacency that led to Task Force Smith fifty years ago is now risking everything on an interim light force to accomplish the very same thing, with potentially the same results.

CHESTER A. KOJRO
LTC, AR (Ret.)

P.S. On page 10, the two tanks in the lower left and right photos are not M46 Pattons, but M26 Pershings. Compare them to the M46 tanks in the photo directly above. The M26 rear drive sprocket is much lower in relation to the return rollers, and there is no idler wheel behind the No. 6 roadwheel.

BADGES AND BERETS STIR THE READERSHIP

On the Armor Badge Decision: "Button Up...Incoming!"

Dear Sir:

Upon reading the September-October issue of *ARMOR*, I was taken aback to discover that the incumbent Chief of Armor/CG of the Armor Center, of all people, is opposed to the Combat Armor Badge (CAB). He thinks it would be "divisive."

Far more divisive, in my opinion, is having a Combat Infantry Badge (CIB) and not having a CAB. The reason for this is elementary. Of all the sundry Army organizations, only two types have the mission, "To close with and destroy the enemy." They are the units that are basically either armor or infantry. But only one of the two has a special badge to recognize service in combat for their soldiers. That is blatantly unfair. The argument that the dismounted soldier is more vulnerable is without merit. Those who are mounted are much more lucrative targets and they attract much more enemy weaponry. Regardless, they are both elite troops and they both deserve being specially honored.

These designated heroes, the guys who are required to put themselves in harm's way to the greatest possible extent, are a relatively small part of the total force. Everyone else in the Army, and all those in the Air Force and Navy, are there to provide them support of some type.

Needless to say, you want the very best people to be in the vanguard. To get them, you must, of course, offer some incentives. Mostly, this is done in a low-cost way by the use of medals/ribbons, badges, and certain uniform items and accouterments. One of these potentially inexpensive motivators, which has long been sought by the armor community, is the CAB. In fact, it boggles the mind that this is still in the category of unfinished business. It does not speak well of me or any of the other senior armor officers of the last 50-plus years when it comes to taking care of our men.

Furthermore, the adoption of this badge should be only the first step in righting a longtime wrong. Much more needs to be done to reward the men who obligate themselves, "To close with and destroy the enemy." They are definitely a special breed who are entitled to special treatment. As a bare minimum, our leaders should be adamant about such things as getting at least 25 percent more pay for these soldier's soldiers (compared to others of the same rank or grade), establishing time-in-grade requirements for promotion for them which are significantly less than for all others, crediting them with 15 months for retirement for every

12 months they serve in such a unit at company/troop level, getting approval for the Expert Armor Badge (EAB) before it is studied to death, and having a special uniform for tankers when they are "tanking" that is at least of the quality and distinction of the ones pilots have when they are "piloting."

On top of these actions, the leaders need to ensure that these soldiers and units are glorified and that people are educated to the fact that "there are soldiers and there are soldiers." How else can you expect young men who enter service to choose an unmarketable MOS over a marketable one and a tough, dirty, and dangerous job over one that is comparatively a piece of cake? And if those in other units think these inducements are so great, they need only be advised that the line for signing up forms to the right.

I don't know if the engineers or others deserve a combat badge. That is up to their leaders to make a case for them if they feel it is warranted. I only know that no one is more worthy in this respect than tankers and cavalrymen (and that includes foot soldiers) and we need to aggressively point out all the reasons why until we are successful.

When the inevitable finally happens and the CAB is adopted, I hope the leadership at the time is also enlightened enough to make this authorization retroactive to when the CIB was approved. This would serve to recognize a lot of outstanding soldiers of former days, even though for many it would be on a posthumous basis. It would also be a fitting tribute to those who, over the years, have kept the faith and fought the good fight for such well-deserved recognition.

As some parting words, I would say that, even in a democratic society, an equalitarian army is an ineffective one, and striving for political correctness only muddies the waters.

To paraphrase Patrick Henry, "If these things be divisive, make the most of it."

COL THOMAS G. QUINN
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Radcliff, Ky.

An Expert Armor Badge Would Probably Mean More

Dear Sir:

I am writing with regard to MG Bell's "Commander's Hatch" in the September-October 2000 issue. From my perspective, down in the ranks, I agree with MG Bell that a "Combat Armor Badge" is probably not a good idea. I say this as a soldier who would qualify if one were ever approved. I propose instead an Expert Armor Badge. I know sev-

eral Infantry soldiers with both the Combat Infantry Badge and Expert Infantry Badge. Almost to a man, they value the EIB more than the CIB.

I also know several medics with both the Expert Field Medical Badge and the Combat Medical Badge; they likewise place higher value on the EFMB. Many of these soldiers "earned" their respective "combat" badge while riding around the desert in a vehicle.

It also should be noted that we already have the "Wartime Service Patch" to denote service in a theater of war. Both "Expert" badges require the candidate to pass a grueling test of their physical and mental stamina, as well as mastery of the fundamentals of their profession. An Expert Armor Badge, with an appropriately rigorous test, would encourage Armor soldiers to excel and recognize those who achieve the higher standard. It would not be awarded solely on the basis of who was selected for which type of operation, but would be available to any Armor soldier who accepted the challenge. I firmly believe that a well managed Expert Armor Badge program would measurably increase the expertise and professionalism of the Armored force.

ROBB D. SHIMP
SPC, CAARNG
C/1-149 AR

Armor Badge No More Divisive Than Current Combat Patches

Dear Sir:

It was with great interest that I read MG Bell's article on a Combat Armor Badge in the last issue of *ARMOR*. Being a long-time and ardent supporter of the badge, I respectfully disagree with MG Bell's position. In the spirit of open and frank dialogue which has long been the hallmark of this magazine, I would like to offer an alternative point of view to various arguments made in the article:

"In my view, the establishment of the CAB could be divisive in the Armor force and create an impression and culture of 'haves and have-nots'."

I hold this to be a false assumption. If this were the case, the argument would hold true for combat patches as well. In 11 years of service, I have not observed a "have/have-not" culture based on combat patches and, therefore, conclude that no such culture would arise because of the badge. Tankers without combat experience view the combat patch as just recognition of those with combat experience and nothing more (no value judgment on the soldier being based on the patch itself). A "have/have-not" culture DOES

exist in the sense that Armor soldiers around the force feel that their contributions on the modern day battlefield are not viewed to be important by those who would deny them the outward recognition currently accorded to the infantry, combat medics, and parachutists.

"We stood by the principle that our entire Armor force was trained and ready to win the first battle of the next war, and the Desert Storm force did just that. We recognized that those who were not called forward were trained and ready and would have served with distinction had their units been sent into the combat zone."

I agree with this premise wholeheartedly, yet, I fail to see what bearing this has on the institution of the badge.

"We all vowed not to penalize those who did not serve in that war — just because they were not called on."

Unfortunately, it appears that we are now penalizing those who did go (and all those who will go in the future), by refusing to support what they, and countless thousands before them in previous conflicts, rightfully earned.

"Should we authorize a CAB for service with a unit in combat, while at the same time minimizing the role of a cavalry scout in Kosovo, an armor crewman in Bosnia or Korea, a drill sergeant at Fort Knox, or an AC/RC NCO at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, because that is where the Army asked them to contribute to the Nation's national security effort?"

I do not believe the institution of a combat skills badge for tankers and scouts would "minimize" anyone's role. The ensuing logic of this argument might well be illustrated in the following quotient: "recognizing combat service in a tank or a scout vehicle = minimizing the role of others." Fifty-seven years of the CIB, the CFMB and the "combat jump star" amongst infantrymen, medics, and parachutists would not bear this equation out. These individuals look at those badges in a wholly positive manner: as the outward recognition that "one of their own" successfully practiced his trade under fire. On the subject of badges in this paragraph, one could conclude — following the logic — that the drill sergeant badge or the recruiter badge serves to "minimize" the roles of those who have never been a recruiter or a drill sergeant?

"In this regard, the establishment of the Armor Badge would likely result in a proliferation of badge proposals from the other branches."

Quite frankly, I see nothing wrong with this potential consequence. If it serves to heighten morale and esprit within the force, then we should all get behind it! Currently we see fit to recognize the combat experience of only select few (to the obvious morale detriment of others — otherwise this topic would not arise "every few years").

"This initiative could result in a landslide of badge requests, every one of which would state: 'Look what I have above my BDU pocket and what you don't have.' Is that really what we want in building cohesive warfighting teams?"

Whether we realize it or not, this phenomenon already exists with the CIB. Having served as a tank platoon leader in a mechanized infantry brigade during Desert Storm, I observed the infantry happily slapping on their CIBs after the cease-fire while the tankers (who had borne the brunt of the direct-fire fight in the brigade) watched in frustrated silence. In this instance, it is time to think of the morale and welfare of Armor soldiers first, disregarding the potential consequences in other branches or the Army as a whole (i.e., the "landslide of badge requests"). We need to do right by our own and support that which "the field" has been asking for since the Second World War.

"The staff here at the Armor Center continues to look at the potential for a competency-based evaluation akin to the Expert Infantry Badge."

In my opinion, this would be a half-measure without a combat equivalent. The comparison will be made (and already has been made in this paragraph) to the EIB, which has a combat equivalent (along with the EFMB). Most soldiers will view any Armor competency badge that does not have a combat equivalent, as an attempt to ape the Infantry without really gaining the recognition currently enjoyed by that branch.

An issue of *ARMOR* published shortly after the Gulf War featured drawings of the proposed Combat Armor Badge and Expert Armor Badge on the back cover. At the time, it was widely expected that, after nearly 50 years, tankers and scouts of the United States Army were finally going to get official recognition for our battlefield contributions in the form of a uniform device. Nearly a decade has passed since those drawings appeared and the expectation remains unfulfilled. Given the long history associated with the debate surrounding the Combat Armor Badge and the repetitive nature of the request for such a device, I would respectfully request the Chief of Armor to reopen discussion on the issue.

RONALD J. BASHISTA
MAJ, Armor
Fort Hood, Texas

Combat Armor Recognition Would Build Better Morale

Dear Sir:

I am writing to express my views on the subject of the Combat Armor Badge (CAB) and Expert Armor Badge (EAB). This is in reference to MG Bell's commentary on the subject in the September-October issue of *ARMOR*. I conducted an unofficial poll of my

National Guard armor battalion, 1-635 Armor, and received a unanimous opinion from those I approached — the CAB and EAB are timely and beneficial to the Armor force.

To put this issue in a broader context, it's no secret to any of us that military services over the ages have recognized the value of special recognition. I wish to address MG Bell's concern regarding a CAB as being divisive. I remember standing in company ranks after the Gulf war was over, hearing members of my company (B Co, 3/32 AR, 1st Cav) asking the same questions of COL Harmeyer (our battalion CO) that the scout SFC asked General Shinseki at the Armor Conference. Namely, when will the Army recognize the validity of the Combat Armor Badge for our branch?

Other Armed Forces (Israelis, Germans, and British to name a few) around the world have long realized the advantages of the *esprit de corps* factor in recognizing Armor as a unique and important part of the team. Berets, boots, devices, branch colors, and insignia are all aimed at boosting morale, unit pride, self-esteem, and the team spirit of soldiers. This isn't divisive; it's exactly what we need. Especially in today's generation, where memories of significant events in military and unit history are largely unknown. Traditions and protocols are vanishing, and combat arms is losing its identity. A comment I read recently in a veterans magazine put it well. To paraphrase, "After 20 years in the civilian world, a person can measure their success by the bank account, the Mercedes in the driveway, and the house in the country. You can read the history of a soldier by his uniform." It's a legacy to the next generation. Has anybody heard a soldier say, "I'm third-generation infantry, or armor, or scout, or engineer, or artillery" or "My Dad wore jump wings, or had the CIB, or was on a Sherman tank?"

Why do we allow soldiers who will never see an aircraft or a parachute again to attend Airborne School? OCS candidates who will branch in something not remotely connected to airborne operations? Because we recognize the value of personal pride in achieving the difficult, in being part of a special segment of military society. Which brings up another point. I hold five MOSs, and every Army MOS is unique and important. As professionals, we are aware that no military force could be successful without the efforts of the entire team. The logistical support in the Gulf was legendary and set records. The tooth couldn't do its job without the tail. Having said that, some of us made the decision to be trigger-pullers. We volunteered to kill people and break things with the knowledge that our personal risk increased in doing so. Why, then, is it so critical that we become an amorphous mass, without acknowledging this distinction?

Continued on Page 50

LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

The EAB is a natural progression for Armor soldiers to demonstrate branch/MOS unique skills and abilities. The added dimension of Armor combat elevates that to the CAB.

I think the Infantry branch has had it right all along, and Armor has a chance to use a tool to promote more team spirit, pride in our history and heritage, not less. Other branches are capable of determining what their needs are. MG Bell is our advocate as branch chief of Armor. I believe if the Armor community were polled on this issue, we would find an overwhelming majority of officers and enlisted support the CAB and EAB.

In closing, I would like to congratulate the *ARMOR* magazine staff on your excellent work. I appreciate the opportunity to express my views in this forum.

C. JOSEPH (JOE) ROMANS
SGM, KSARNG
OPS SGM 1-635 AR
Pauline, Kan.

Combat Badges Haven't Hurt Infantry, Combat Medic Cohesion

Dear Sir:

I was totally surprised at the stand taken by the Chief of Armor (COA), pertaining to the Combat Armor Badge (CAB), expressed in the September-October issue of *ARMOR*.

The COA states there are two overriding arguments that tell him the CAB is not right for our force. The first is the divisive nature of such an award, and the second is its impact on the overall army. Allow me to discuss these two points.

In my view, the establishment of the award would not be divisive in the Armor force and would not create a culture of "haves and have-nots" (COA term). To believe that a culture of "haves and have-nots" would be created is to believe that many in the Armor force possess an envious, petty, and jealous mentality. This I do not believe. The establishment of such an award would recognize the fact that certain members of our force met the ultimate challenge of our profession — combat. Should we withhold from these armor warriors the recognition that is due them? It is a fact that all members of any branch do not serve in combat in any war. All infantrymen, even during WWII, did not serve in combat, but they did perform other vital functions, just as many in our Armor force did not serve in combat but did perform other important duties. *By the establishment of this award, we are not penalizing those who did not go to war — we are recognizing those who did.* If the establishment of such an award would create a divisive situation and create a culture of "haves and have-nots," the Infantry and Medical Corps would have had trouble long before now.

I do not believe the establishment of this award would fragment the cohesion that exists between combat soldiers and support soldiers. The fact will always remain that

front line units are only as good as their support, but the fact also remains that the combat soldiers are the ones doing the fighting and most of the dying. There are two exceptions to this statement — the combat medics and the combat engineers. The medics have their badge; I would vote for the combat engineers to have theirs also. As to the situation where the 97B CI soldier is assigned to a scout squad, the solution is simple — build into the regulation an "exception to policy" criteria.

As to the Army becoming overcome with request for types of badges for everyone, I do not feel the COA should be concerned; this would become a CSA problem.

DONALD E. HORN
CSM, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Armor Soldiers in the Gulf Deserved Combat Badges, Too

Dear Sir:

I was extremely excited when I read the headline of the "Commander's Hatch" in the September-October issue — "The Combat Armor Badge." I thought to myself, finally an Armor leader willing to stand up for the branch and the soldiers who represent the branch. I was devastated by MG Bell's stance.

He mentioned two points:

It will cause divisiveness. Has this happened in the Infantry Branch between what he called the "haves and have-nots"? I think it has not. It has only added to the *esprit de corps* of that fine branch.

Impact on the Army overall? The German Wehrmacht had a combat badge for all its branches; this seemed to work well for them, and I agree any soldier should be eligible for a combat-type badge.

I cannot describe to you the feelings I had trying to answer the questions of my young

soldiers in 4-64 Armor, after they witnessed our mortars receiving their CIBs: "Sir, they didn't even fire a shot,"... "We were in front of them," etc., etc. I believe our mortarmen deserved this award, I also think our 19Ds, 19Ks, and medics also deserved a badge.

At a time when the services are facing retention and recruiting concerns, I would think another bonus in terms of a much deserved award would only help morale. I know morale is down in the Armor force; I still talk to the many friends I have on active duty, and they are not happy.

I also wonder if his stance would be different if he had been in the Gulf. I hope he becomes a leader in this issue for our well-deserved Armor veterans.

TODD A. MAYER
Cincinnati, Ohio

"Not Again!" Says Veteran, Warning Against the Beret

Dear Sir:

Definition:

PITH HELMET *n.* A light sun hat made from dried pith.

I will tell you up front, the pith helmet is the answer. This past summer I celebrated my 60th birthday. Once again, as in the past several summers, I did it by giving my dermatologist another chunk of money for services rendered. You see, once upon a time, I was a young man of steel (I thought). There was nothing on this earth that could hurt me. Nothing would ever hurt me. Well, I was wrong. I was worn down and hurt a little at a time until now I will hurt for the rest of my life. Here is the background on how this happened.

About 100 years ago, people were more in touch with, and had a better understanding of nature. Styles of dress were functional.

Expert Armor Badge Under Study by OCOA

The Office of the Chief of Armor (OCA) is currently developing an Expert Armor Badge proposal. While we will go out for formal staffing in the future, we would greatly appreciate your comments during the developmental stage. Many will remember MG Bell's EMAIL earlier this year outlining his reasons for not supporting the establishment of a Combat Armor Badge. In this same EMAIL, he stated that he would consider a competency-based badge proposal. The Expert Armor Badge (EAB), developed utilizing the Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) as a baseline, is the

OCA proposal for that competency-based badge.

By going to the Armor Center Home-page <http://knox-www.army.mil/index.stm> and clicking on the EAB ICON, the system will take you to the EAB page. There you will find an overview of the proposal and a survey form. OCA would greatly appreciate your review of the proposal and completion of the survey form.

Again, this is not a formal staffing of the proposal. However, your comments will be critical in guiding our development efforts.

New Draft Manuals To Be Posted on the Web

The Doctrine Division of the Armor Center's Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development will post the drafts of three new field manuals tailored to the new Initial Brigade Combat Teams on a web site for inspection and comment from the force. The Armor Center has proponentcy for the mobile gun system platoon, the reconnaissance platoon, and the new *FM 17-15* cavalry manuals. In order to view the drafts and comment, you will need to

log in and obtain a password from Mrs. Bev Flavell at:

flavellb@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil

You will need to provide your name, rank, SSN, duty phone, and unit.

Comments on the draft manuals can be forwarded to CPT Glenn Hemminger at Glenn.Hemminger@knox.army.mil, or by phoning DSN 464-4097 or commercial 502-624-4097.

You could dress stylishly and yet still be practical. We were a people that knew how to dress for the weather. Women even carried umbrellas when the sun was shining. Men wore real hats — not just a little beret or a baseball cap, but a real hat with a wide brim. But then something happened to change all that.

About 60 years ago, we had a world war, and after that, attitudes all over the world changed. Somebody, somewhere, decided to become "stylish" and decided that playing in the sun was wonderful. Getting a tan was great, the more tan the better, and that the fewer clothes you wore, the more area you could tan. And that was even greater. Oh to be tan all over, to be stylish!

So we can trace back to World War II as the beginning of the big change. And it was the tough guys of the war that started all of this. If you find this hard to understand, see if

you can follow me on this: When looking at old movies or newsreels from the '20s and '30s, we see an entirely different form of dress. Men that worked out-of-doors protected themselves from the sun with long-sleeved shirts, wide-brimmed hats, long pants, and good, heavy shoes. People who were going to be outside just for pleasure were also sun-conscious and dressed accordingly, even at the beach. But after WWII, all of this changed. Men started by not wearing tops at the beach. They worked in the sun in just shorts and sandals. And some idiot even invented the bikini bathing suit for woman. After that idea was sold, it only got worse with time. My father, 82 years old, just had 31 cancers removed from his upper body. I do not even want to think about the cost, but every one of those skin cancers needed stitches. He was one of those tough guys of WWII. Of course, he passed on to his sons some very bad habits.

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You are probably asking, so what is the point?

It was pre-WWII, when the Army had this wonderful headgear that the Army had adopted from the British. It was the pith helmet, the pith helmet that was light and airy and protected the wearer from the sun. After the war started, "They" decided to get stylish and did away with the pith helmet (that was light and airy and protected the wearer from the sun). They instead adopted a baseball cap that many civilians had taken to wearing. Then came the Louisville "spring-up," more baseball caps, and the absolutely stupid beret. When I was in the Army, I sure looked sharp in that old Texas desert with my black beret on. Oh boy, did I ever look sharp! No matter that my ears burnt off, or that my face took terrible punishment from the sun. I looked sharp. I was stylish.

And now... I too have skin cancer, just like my dad. He taught me well.

And now... Someone wants to bring back the stupid beret.

My great Uncle Sam let me down. Not directly, and not with malice, but with a subtle stupidity that I will suffer the consequence of for the rest of my life.

Wouldn't it be great if "They" would decide to adopt a functional headgear for once?

LEONARD E. WRIGHT
Tng Spec, 16th Cav

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